In Ingram v. Kulynych Estate, 2024 ONCA 678, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appropriate limitation period where two different limitation periods were applicable and apparently in conflict in relation to a claim against an estate.

Background

Henry Kulynych died in February 2017. In his Will, Mr. Kulynych left his estate to his first wife, and if she predeceased him, which she did, then to his three children. Mr. Kulynych’s daughter, Cherise Charron, obtained a certificate of appointment of estate trustee in July 2018. In his Will, Mr. Kulynych left nothing to Kathleen Ingram, who claimed to have been in a common law relationship with Kulynych from 1999 until his death, and to have supported him financially and emotionally.

At his death, Mr. Kulynych’s estate was valued at $690,119.59, and by April 2019, was distributed to his three children pursuant to his Will. A small holdback of just under $2000 remained in the estate until July 2021, which Ms. Charron as estate trustee then distributed to herself.

In March 2019, Ms. Ingram sent a demand letter to Ms. Charron claiming she was entitled to receive one-third of the total value of the estate. Ms. Charron refused Ms. Ingram’s demand.

On March 10, 2021, more than four years after Mr. Kulynych’s death, Ms. Ingram commenced a claim against the estate for dependant’s support under the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26, as well as an equitable trust claim for a share of the estate.

Motion

Ms. Charron brought a motion in writing in which she sought the dismissal of Ms. Ingram’s claim on the ground that it was statute-barred as it was commenced more than two years after Mr. Kulynych’s death in contravention of s.38(3) of the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23. In dismissing motion, the motion judge held that the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15 (“RPLA”) applied to equitable trust claims against an estate. However, Ms. Ingram’s claim was a property claim, as opposed to “a wrong” committed against the estate as defined under s.38(2) of the Trustee Act. Ms. Charron appealed.

Appeal

On appeal, the Court confirmed the correct analytical approach when considering which of two limitation periods was applicable. The factors include the historical approach to the limitation periods in issue, including the legislative purpose of the relevant statutory limitation periods in issue; the judicial approach to interpreting the limitation periods in issue; the nature of relief sought in the action; and the language of the statutory limitation periods.

Section 38(2) of the Trustee Act provides:

Except in cases of libel and slander, if a deceased person committed or is by law liable for a wrong to another in respect of his or her person or to another person’s property, the person wronged may maintain an action against the executor or administrator of the person who committed or is by law liable for the wrong.

Section 38(3) of the Trustee Act states that “[a]n action under this section shall not be brought after the expiration of two years from the death of the deceased.”

The Court previously confirmed that the Trustee Act imposed a strict two-year limitation period to which the discoverability principle does not apply. This confirmed the legislative intent that actions against estates be subject to a shorter, stricter limitation period, which reflects the long-standing duty of estate trustees to administer an estate promptly, including ascertaining the estate’s debts and liabilities as quickly as possible, to permit the estate trustee to distribute the estate to the beneficiaries and avoid indefinite fiscal vulnerability.

Moreover, the “wrong” contemplated under s.38(2) of the Trustee Act is not restricted to only tort claims but includes all actionable wrongs against an estate for which a deceased may be found liable.

While there are exceptions to the limitation period under various section of the RPLA which provide for ten and six-year limitation periods, these were discreet and clear exceptions to the overriding legislation intent that other estate trust claims under s.38(2) of the Trustee Act be subject to the two-year limitation period under s.38(3).

In the present case, the claim for unjust enrichment, as pleaded by Ms. Ingram, was a “wrong” that fell under s.38(3) of the Trustee Act, as she asserted that during her relationship with Mr. Kulynych, he benefitted at her expense by living rent-free in her house, while renting out his own house and retaining the income for himself.

With respect to the apparent conflict between s.38 of the Trustee Act and s.4 of the RPLA, the Court applied the statutory interpretation principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, which provides that special or more specific legislation overrides general legislation in the case of conflict on the same subject to bring the two statutes into harmony. In the present case, the Court concluded that s.38 of the Trustee Act was more specific that s.4 of the RPLA, which was more general, and provides:

No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it. [Emphasis added.]

Moreover, Ms. Ingram’s equitable trust claim was not “action to recover any land”, as the nature of her claim was in relation to estate assets, and not Mr. Kulynych’s real property.

Therefore, the two-year limitation period under s.38(3) of the Trustee Act applied to Ms. Ingram’s claim, the appeal was allowed, and Ms. Ingram’s claim was dismissed.

Take Away

This case demonstrates that claimants and their counsel should err on the side of caution and always endeavor to commence claims against an estate, regardless of their nature and how they are pleaded, within two years of the deceased’s date of death, to avoid any risk of running afoul of the limitations period.